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In svmmetric  independent private value auctions of a single object with risk new
tralvbidders7  the English (second price) auction has a strategic simplicitv.’ It is
oxkmal for bidders to reveal their valuation for the object and make bids”accord-
i&iv.v IO that cae  the auction is won bv the person with the highest valuation,4
who pays a price equal to the second highest valuation. Izl a Dutch (fzst price)
auction, this simDlicitv  vanishes. Here winrkg  bidders have to pay their bid. In& v
order to make a Drofit thev shade their bids and
object. Somewhat loosel~~oae  mav state that anv
ing, whereas a Dutch auction requires strategic
of the one-unit English auction vanishes if two
bid below their valuatioxl  of the
English auction is truth reveal-
behavior. .The  simple structure
identical objects are auctioned
sequentially. Xow,  in the  first rousd  it is op’iimal  for bidders to shade their bids#
to account for the oBtion value of participating in the subsequent second round
‘Weber 1983)\ Bidders with a higher valuation also have a higher option value.
There&e the;  shade their bids in the fkst round by a @eater imount than bid-
ders with a liwer valuation. As the auction xoceeds.  the nwmber  of bidders
decreases. Over the sequence of auctions the x&m~er of objects decreases as wef1.
The first has a negative efkct 0x1.  the competitiorz.  for ax1 object. the second has
a positive eEect . Both ef?ects  cancel oxt,  and prices follow a &ark-gale. As  a
result, all gains to waitirrg  are arbitraged awav and the espected  Drices  in both, 4 A
rounds are the same. The latter result also holds for sequesztial auctions of more
than two objects and  does not depend on whether there is an Exglish o!:  a Dutch
auction.
This neat theoretical result is not sapported  by empirical research (see e.g.
Ashenfelter.  1989, who finds  a price decline in a sequence of auctions of identical,
lots of wine).  Because of tke  contradiction between theory and  empirical studies
the declining price is considered to be an anomaly.
A number of recent theoretical studies have given exglarzations  for declining
prices in sequential auctions. .These  can be distinguished according to whether
the cause is in the preferences of the bidders. the structure of the auction, or, ,
the nature of the objects. An example of the first cause is provided by the exis-
tence of a specific tvpe  of risk aversion among the buvers  (McAfee and Vincent,
1993).  F‘or anothe;  examDle,  see Branco  (1997), wio considers an auction. of
objects of which for some bidhers  the v&e  is superadditive. An example of the
second came  concerns the existence of a buve?s  option, whereby the winner of
the firs% auction has the opportunity to buy  the remaining objects at the win-
‘See McAfee and AM2i4iilac, 19S?, and Vblfstetter~ 1996,  for survevs  of t’ne  auction literature.v
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ning price (BIack and De Mesa?  1993).  Other examples cower3  auctions where
bidders or auctioneers act as agents who are instructed tu win a~  object at anv
price up to a specified maximum (Milgrom  and Weber, 1982b). or where bii-I
ders have to pav participation costs (Van der Fehr. 1%X*  YIe2ezes  axt Muateiro.
.$i9%->.  Enge!b~ec;?t-Wiggaos  (1994): Bernhardt  z&d Scoones (1994): and Gale
and Hausch  (i994)  relate  the price decline to heterogeneitv  of objects. In Section
3 we discuss theoretical studies and their relevance for thebresent studv  in detail.J
In this study we xse data fro&m  the -4alsmeer  Flower  Auction (&4FA4)  on roses
to anaivze  price movemeEts  io  seouential  auctions. AFL4  is located in The  Sether-s/ *
lands  and  is the largest auctiort. of ornamental plant products (cut Aowers:  house
pZ23ts  etc.) in the world. AFA4  uses a Dutch auction to sell products. Products
are supplied as “lots”./ which are defined as the total amouot  of a given product
(or article) supplied by a given grower on a given  day. *4  lot consists of a number
of fully identical “units” (a unit is a fked number of f!iowers.  in our case a bucket/
of roses). ,The  auctioning of the units of a given lot is sequential. in the followingI
manner.  Upon winoing  the first auction associated with a given  iot,  the buver*/
a~lnounces how many units he buys at the winning price. If this number fails
short of the supplied number of units then the  remaining units are auctioned io
the same way?  until all units are sold. ,riFA  has a buver’s  option which is often”
although not always exercised. Typicailv ad1 given lot is auctioned in nzore  than
a single round.
We  restrict attention to so-called “specialty” roses. that is, rather expensive
roses with 6.32  exiusive image. ‘Xlhe  reason for this is’ that these are auctioaed
without mandaxorv  AminimuAm purchase quantities. For most other tvpes  or”  roses.4 J ,
the minimum rnxmber of uzlits  to be bought at the sequectial  auction of a given ioi;
increases during the sequential auctioning of a given lot. -4ccordicg to a survey
questionnaire heid  among buvers at AF64:  this is the main reasun  for the observed
price declines fur roses in geieral (see Kalicharar:.  1995). We focus on speck&vI 4
roses in order to be able to abstract from this potential cause of declining prices.
The latter cause wuuld  be verv  difEcult  to analvze.  because the auctioneer mavY J , 4
increase the minimum purchase quantity in a way which depends on previous
oUtComes  PyIithin  the sequential auction.
,The  setup of our  anafvsis is as follows. First. we establish that there is a
price decline in sequentia!“auctioos  of roses. We reiate  this to the characteristics
of the auction in order to evaluate the relevance of alternative explanations for
price declines that are given in the literature. Given the specific nature of the
auction, we can dismiss some of these explanations. The estimation results are
then used to pinDo&  the most likely  cause of the price declines we observe. Here,*
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we focus on the shape of the  price decline and the wav in which this is re!ated  tox4
observable characteristics of the auction.
There have been a number of empirical studies on seqxxential.  aPrctions  (see
references in Section 3). _Viany  of these involve  sequential arrctions  of objects
that are not fuliy  homogeneous, arrd  sometimes the heterogeneous characteristic
is even unobservabfe  for the researcher. Also, may empirical studies consider
only  seqxxntial  auctions of limited size. L’sually, only two or three objects are
auctioned sequentiallv.  In contrast, OUT data COEC~TE  sequential auctions in whichr,
the auctioned lots consist of many units, and each 10:  is Pal!y  homogenous.  -4s a
resl-;lt,  we axe able to investigate the declining r>rice  Dhenomenon  in great detai1.
Our ksults  therefore xxovide  additional insights in& the nature of the declining
price phenomenon. &4Luther  distinguishing feature of the auction we consider is
the fact that this is a Dutch (descending first-price) sequential auction, whereas
most empirica  studies in the literature deal with second-price sequential auctions.
From an econometric point of view7  the emBirica1 analysis advances on earlier*
studies of seguentia!  auction data. Most of those studies analyze data  bv exam-*I
icing &mean prices at different rounds in a sequential auction, or bv regressing the
price orp  the rank number of the corresponding  round. Howeve;,  there mav be
unobserved determinants of the price that are stochasticallv  related to the EaokJ
numbers that are observed in the data. If this is ignored then sucks methods of
inference mav provide inconsistent estimates of the magni:ude and sigxzifkancerJ
of the price decline. To deal with this, we applv methods that  are commonlv
used to estimate panel data. In particular, we ke fked elect recessions an&
first-difkrexlce  regressions (see e.g. Hsiao. 1986).
The setup of this  paper is as folloplrs.  ‘In Section 2 we describe the Aalsmeer
Flower  &4uctiuxl  in detail. In Section 3 we give an overview of previous work on
the deciining  price anomafv. Section 4 contains the emxkical  analysis. Section 5e *
concludes.
2 The Aalsmeer Flower Auction
2.1 General statistics
In this sectiun  we give some general statistics cuncerning  the A4a1smeer  Flower
*4uction  (AF*4),  axa,d  we provide detaiis of the actual auciioning  xxucess. Most of
the information on the general statistics is from the -4nnual  Reiorts  of d4FA4  in
recent years (see e.g. Bloemenveiling  AE11smeex, 1996a).
+4F+4  is located in A4alsmeeX7 close to Amsterdam, The SetherlaEds. It is
the largest auction of ornamental plant products (cr;t flowers, indoor plants,
mrden  plants etc.) in the world. Its current annual turnover is about 2.5 billio@
Fhtch guilders (about 1.3 billion VS  Dollars: 1997). *4F*4  is a cooperative owned,
by about 4000 D u c L .  growers of the auctioned products.vb The magnitude of
AF4  refkts the importance of the market for ornamental plant products for
the Dutch ecoaomv. Iodeed. The Setherlacds  is the world’s leading producerv /
aod distributer of cut fiowers. and Eowers  are The Setherlands’  most important
export xxoduct. AFb4  itself kmDIovs  about 1800 workers. but on a given davL u , J
about G,OOO  individuals do their work in the auctioxl  buildizlgs  (the latter number
incfudes  sumdiers  azd  buvers).
To giveAskme  further kdicatiom  of the size of AF-AT  the current  total accrual
swpfy consists of about 4.3  billion single flowers. 330 million indoor plants (or& ,
house&ants) and 150  milXlon garden plants. ‘The  currer;st  annual import includes
1.8 billion single  flowers. Of these, the largest  shares are supplied bv Israel. KenvaI
and Spain. The value of the current annr;al  exDon of Bowers a&  houseDla&
equals 4.4 and 7L .8 billion guiiders. , respectivekA4 For flowers: Germany:  &axe
and the United  Kingdom are the most important markets, while for housepia=ltsI
these are Germany, France  and Italv.
The total number of growers Dakcioating in ke auctions eauals  about 7100.
Of these, almost 1500  are from abroad. !Che rota1  mxnber  of bxi*ers  ecmals  about
U’QO.  The dispersion of their shares in total turnover is enormuus.  bn the ow
hand. abozt 50 buvers each buv  for more than 10 million guilders a year: togetherI * u
this aAmomts  to  about 507~  of zotal turrzover. 0~  the oiher hand, about 725,
buyers each buv  for less than 0.1 million guilders a vear: together this amountsJ J ,
to about 1% of total turnover. These two extremes basicaily  correspond to big
exporting compacles  and smaI1  domestic retail shops, respectively. Obviously the
large  buyers are acting as agents. For  cut Bowers  this dispersion is similar in size.
&4bout  one third of the buyers each buys for less than 0.05 miUiozm guilders per
year: which together amounts to only 0.27~  of total turnover in cr;t Bowers.
Finally,  it should be mentioned that roses are the most important products*
that are auctioned at A4FA4. ,Together: they amount to 337~  of the total turnover
of cut Bowers.
2.2 Institutional features of the auctioning process
*4F’*4  uses a Dutch auction to sell  products. As a start. consider the auctioning of,
a certain lot of a homogeneous product. -4  “lot”  is defined as the total amount
of a given product (or article) supplied  by a given gower  on a given day. ‘The*
walx  in front  of the awtioning  room  contains a Iarge  board with a clock and ax1
electronic dispia;3;  of properties of the product to be auctioned (identity of the
grower7  name of the product. various quality indicators, length of the stem in/
case of f3owers  and size of the flower pot in case of plants) as we11  as Droperties6
of the  setup of the auction (monetarv  unit. minimwn xxice;  possibly a minimxxn
purchase qua&i&). The flowers orw plants  are traosported through the FOCXE,e ,
and ax3 employee takes a few items from the carriage to show them to the buvers
(buvers  aku have the opzxxtunity to ciuseiy examize  the flowers some time before
the G act-iral  auctioning). A The auctioneer decides ox1 a starting positiun  for the
clock hand which corresponds to an unreasonably high Price for the xxuduct.  He
then sets the cluck irr  motion. ‘T’he value pointed at ij?; the ciuck hand2  drops
continuously until a buyer stops the clock bv pushing the button in front of him.
The value x>ointed  at bv the clock hand at dthat moment is the price to be paid
by that buyer for a single  item. .The buvez then announces how Amany ~~~nits~’  heJ
wants to buy. +4  %nit” is defined as a fixed amount of single  items (e.g., for a
particular tvpe of flower, a unit can be defined as 120  fiuwers; this definition isY
Exed for a given  product ). The identitv of the buver is shcwn  on the e1ectrocic
display in front of the mum. If the &mber of u&s he buvs falls short of the4
supplied number of units then the clock is reset to a verv high value, and the
process restarts for the left-over units.  If agDlicabIe. the kxtiuneer  mav decide
to stipulate a different3  minimum purchase qiaatitv ihan before. Recall  howevever
that fur the prudwts  analyzed in this paDer the x&nim~m purchase quantitv is
always simply 1. This goes on x.nxtil  the^n;huie  lot is sold. If the hand of the
cluck passes the minimum price then the remaining lot is destruved.  Every lot isa/
auctioned in this manner.
The minimwn  price fur a given product is tied throughout the vear (at least,v
“Actr?a-lly,  the clot’-  iA s designed as a circie  of small lamps each corresponding to a give2
monetary valve, SC& that a clockwise movement  corresponds  to a decrease of this  value. If the
clock is set in motiorr  then consecutive lamps light up sYequentiaIly.
3 The auctioneers often use standard seqr;ences for tE,e  minimum purchase quantity of a
given product. For examTIe, for tulips, ia, about 90% of al! auctions: the minimum cumber
of units to be buught at consecutive auctiocs of a O’maven  lot is stipulated according to the se-
ries (2,4,4,6,6,9,9.9,9,  . ..). For roses this series usuaIlv  is (3,&g,  9,9,9,9,  . ..j.  HuweverY an. Y .
auctioneer .may  deviate from sxh sequences, ir, respocse  to what he perceives as idiosyncratic
shocks. He may even decide to deviate from the standard sequence somewhere haXway the
sequential auctior,iag  of a given lot. AoparentlyT  the auctioneers we xxles of thumb to govern.
such deviations. Fur example, they may occasionaIly  stipnlate  a high minimum purchase quan-
tity iz order to try to make buyers believe ‘;Lat  su?pIy  is short. For a smaX number of specific
products, AFA has decided against minimum gurchase  quantities.  These  mostlv concern rather”
expemive fbwers.
for the time periods froAm  which our data are). For exampie,  for houseplants,
the minimum price in 1996 was 23 cents ner  single plant,  while for roses with,
large fiowers (including soecialties)  it was  10  teats per flower (i.e., per item).
The rnkknxrn prices are pubiished  ix a~  annual code-book which is distributed
among  bq-ers  and growers (see e.g. Bloemenveiling  Aaismeer,  1996-b).
Kow  iet us go back one step and consider how .4FA4  chooses the order of the
auctioning of different Iots. -4F&4  wes  the tverm  “auctioz  group” to denote a
group of products with similar features. For example. about 120  auction groupsI
are defined for the 3300  varieties of cut flowers. The sequexe in which auction
grot~ps  appear at the auction is the same on every day. However!  the sequence in
which dif?erernt  lots within an auction gQIOCD  ax>pear  at the auction is rar;domized.
The -4FA  buildings contain four auctik rooms.  ‘f’he  total number of clocks
equals 13.  These clocks are ofiez  used at the same ti,-;le:  so that Simultaneous
au&ions  t;ake  place  wit&c  a room. *4s  a result. itI is difhk to observe the number
of participants at a giver, auction. A gives  individuai can ociy  participate in or;e
auction. but a given buver  may of course delegate more than  one individuai to/
an auction room. The Enmjer  of seats in an auction room is about 500.  The
average duration of a single auction (Le.. one transaction) equals just a couple
of seconds. The average number of zrakactions x>er  dav at .4FA4  equals aboutA J
30,000.
3 Theoretical analysis
3.1 TheoreticaX  studies
In this section we examine the theoretical literature oc prices in sequential aw-
Cons. We also investigate to what extent theoretical explanations for the declin-
ing price phenomenon apply to the Dutch Bower  auction.
The theoretical literature 011  secuerrtial.  auctions is concerned with the gen-A
erakization  of a basic sequential. auction model. This basic model assumes “iz-
dependent  private values” (IPV):  a bidder knows his own vaIuation,  but he onlv
knows the distribution from which the rivals’ valuations are drawn. The vaiUa-
tions of diRerent  bidders are independent  random draws from this distribution.
There are tuo  fullv homogeneous object,s  to be auctioned (so that there are two
rounds in the sekential  auction). each bidder onlS;  waxts  one object. and the,
bidders are risk-nkutrai.  The auction design is second-price sealed-bid. Milgrom
and Weber  (1982b)  aad  Weber (1983) show that in equilibrium. the  gains of wait-,
ko-  are wbitraged  awav so that the espected  prices in all rouds  are the same.A  b L r/
Weber  (1983) shows that this result also applies to the modification of the basic
mode1 where the auction design is first-price sealed-bid.
Milgrom  and \veber ( 1982aT  1982b).  among others, shuw  that if the IPV
framework is replaced 5v a common-va&e  or aE!,ated~value framewosk,  then*
this remit does not hold Lwmore (see also the discussion in BIack and De !Meza,
1993). Instead. price trajeixozies  are upward trended, 2otabIv eaxlv 02  in the
seauential  auctior?. Basicaily,  early auctions release in&rmatiu~ abo;t the va1ueA
of the good, thereby reducing coxlcerzs about the winner’s curse in subsequeot
auctions, and there is a strategic  incentive to foul the other bidders into believing
that the true value is Iow.
Ashenfelter  (1939)  suggests that risk aversion may explain declining prices
in sequential auctions. For risk averse bidders: the randomness of the secolzd
auction  reduces the value of this auction. In case twu identical items are auc-
Gone& the expected price in the second period is fewer because the price in the
first period also contains a risk premium associated with the risky future  price.
However, the theoretical. analvsis  bv Mc,rifee  arrd Vincent (1993) casts doubt on
the relevance of risk aversioEdas  ai exx2anatiun  of declining prices. Thev show
both for first-price and for second-price sealed-bid auctions that if the bidders
exhibit non-decreasing absolute risk aversion then wices  tend to decline within*
the sequential auction. Ilowevez, non-decreasing absolute risk aversion is an un-
satisfactory characterization of attitudes to risk. But it is necessary to assume
nun-decreasing absolute risk aversion io order to obtain pure-strategy?  munotonic. ,
equilibrium bid&o g fwctions. If bidders exhibit increasing absolute risk aver-
sion then DO  pure strategy equilibria exist. sequential auctions may lead to an
inefEcient  alIocation,  and in that case there’is an incentive for retrading after the
suction.
Black and De ,\Xeza  (1993) extend the basic model in two steps. First, thevJ
assume that bidders are interested in the acquisition of more than one object.
The value to a bidder of acquiring two objects is assumed to be less than twice
the valrne  of a single object . So, the bidders have a high valuation for the first
object and a Sower valuation for the second object. They examine both second-
price sealed-bid auctions and English auctions. aDd they show that the price
tends to increase. For the special case of two’ bidders, this can be explained
intuitivelv (see also faarsch  and Robert. 1996). The bid of both bidders in theI
frrst  rocn;!  is eaual to their low valuation. That means that the bidder with the
higher valuatio6s  (say, the first bidder) gets an object for a price ecpal to  the
1ow valuaticn of the second bidder. If the high valuation of the second bidder is
higher than the low valuation of the first bidder who won the frst  round, then. the
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second bidder TL%S  the second auction and pays a price equal to the low valuation
of the first  bidder. Since the low valuation of the frst bidder is higher rhan  the
low valuation of the second bidder. the Price ix the second auction is higher thanI A
the price irr the first. SkniIarIv.  if the high vaiuation of the second  bidder is louxr
than the low valuation of the&St bidder who won the round:  then the first
bidder  wins the second  auction and pavs a price equal to the high valuation of
the sccocd bidder. Since the high vaiukon  of the second bidder is higher that
the low vaIuatio2  of the secoad bidder. the xxice ia the second auction is again:,
higher than? the price in the first. 10  sum,  the price tends to increase. Paarsch,
and Robert (1996) show that this resuit  can be generalized to auctions of more
than two objects.
In their second step, Hack  and De Meza  (1993) show that this resrrit  cam be
reversed (i.e .: the price tends to decline) if the auctioxl.  aIIom;s  for a buyer’s option*
whereby the winner of the first auction has the opDortuoity  to buv additional
objects at the saA’xle  price. Ia that case, the bidde;  with the lowest valuations,
cam x1.0  longer assume  that he will win al Ieast one item if his high valuation is
higher than his rival’s low vaiuation,  because this rival  may win  the first  roundI
and exercise the  oDtion.  The winner wil! aIways  exercise the option if the se?,iinga&
price is below his How valuation. The secoxd,d  bidder therefore has an incerrtive
to bid up in the Erst  round ic order to prevent the f&t bidder from eserciskg
the ox&z But ir; the two-bidder case. if the.A , optio I?,  is not exercised, the second,
price is the first-round winner’s low valuation. Hence, the second object nxs~
necessariiv  self for less thaE  the first.  It should be mentioned that if the number of
bidders is;arger than two then io  some cases the price may  actualiy rise, although
nwnerical  examples in Black and De -Meza (1993) with three buyers suggest that
on average the price declines. Interestingly7  these exampies  aIso  suggest that the
&uveA  option  is in the interest of the seler.  So results have been derived for
a&ions of three or more objects if a buyer’s or>tiolz  is aIIowed.
Branco  (1997)  also considers an auction ii which bidders are interested i=1
the acauisition  of more than one object. However. cootrarv to Black and De
Meza (;993);  he assumes  that the vaIue  to a bidder of acqufring  two objects is
assumed to be more than the sun of the valuations of the separate objects. This
means that preferences are super-additive. In his model there are two objects and
two bundle bidders. Because a bundle bidder has an extra gain if he succeeds in
buying both objects, both loudie bidders are more aggressive in the first auction.
In the second auction  onlv  the winner of the first auction wiI1  bid aggressiveiv.
‘This  cawes  the expected price to decline over the sequence of the auction.
e
-Milgrom  and  VVeber  (1982b)  argue that a price decline in sequential auctions
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mav arise from the presence of bidders who act as agents. These agents bid to4
win an object at am-  price up to a specific maximum Drice,  so thev do not behave
strategically. If nooe  of the other bidders bids su2&ntl~  high.*the  agent with
the highest maximum price wins the first auction. If, agak:  in the second round
none of the other bidders has the highest bid the a&nts with the second highest
mz&mun  price wins the second auction at a price which is obviously lower than
the winning price in the first  auction. In the extreme case where all the bidders
act as agents  the fkst  auction is FOE  by the agent with the highest maximum
price, the second auction is wua by the agent with the second highest price etc..
A number of theoretical studies examine sequential auctions of objects that
are in some seEse  perceived to be heterogeneous. It turns out that various furms  of
heterogeneitv  are able to generate declining prices (see for example Engefbrecht-
Wiggans,  19&i:  Bernhardt and Scoones.  1994:  Gale and Hausch.  1994; and Beggs,
and Graddy, 1997). ‘Xl‘his need not cooc~~r.  us here, as in this paper we deal with,
f-&y homogeneous objects?
Yet another exglanation of declining prices in sequential auctions considers
the existence of participation costs (VOIP  der Fehr, 1994;  Menezes and Monteiro.
1997).  If losing bidders in the first  round realize that they only have a srnali
probability of winning, participation costs may induce these bidders to leave the.
auction. which causes expected prices to decline.
Kes& and Olson  (1996) use faboratorv experiments to study prices in sequen-J
tial ffrst-price  sealed-bid IPV auctions. Thev too find that rsrices  decline. In theJ *
set-up of their experiment there is no heterogeneity of objects and x10 buyer’s
option, and the bidders caxnot buv more than one object. Furthermore, thevu u
find that certain features of the price outcomes cannot  be explained bv risk aver-
sion. azd that bidders who act as agents do not behave digerently  &on:  other
bidders. From  this they conclude that declining prices cannot be fully  attributed
tu risk aversion, heterogeneity, a buver’s option, the institutional structure of the
English auctiod, bidders acting as aients, etc.. In this respect the declining price
is still  an anomaIy.  Sote that the findings by Keser and Olson (1996) do not
exclude the buyer’s option from being a quantitatively important expfanation of
observed price declines in real-life auctioas.  The experiments merely show that
even without these explanations there is a C:residuaI”  xxice decline.A
AS mentioned in the introduciion, there have been a number of empirical
ACBernha.rdt and Scoozes  (1994) indicate tht their mode! zxoj,b;y  does not explair?, declining*
prices in the case of wine auctions, for the reason that it is mlikely  that a bidder’s mluatiorr.
would diffkr  acruss  identic& bts of wine: % rusC; is a rose is a ros6”. This refers to oxx
assumption that “a rose is a ruse is a rose”.
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studies on price chaages  in sequential auctions, and we ead this subsection by
briefiy  mentioning some izlterestir,g  results. Ashecfelter  (1989) finds a mild x>rice
decrease in seauentia!.  auctions of identical urits of wine. azd  he attribr?tes* this
to risk aversion of the bidders. These auctiox allow for a &yer’s  option. M&fee
and Vincent A(1993)  also present empirical evidence on seauentia1  wine auctions.
,Thev Snd  that. on average. the second ur,it  of wine is so!d  at a price I.@?$  lowerd ,
than the price of the first ‘unit. Donald. Paarsch and Robert (1997) find  price/
increases in their analysis of timber auctions n-here  bidders are interested ixl
more  than one object. These are Ecg!ish  auctions  of homogeneous objects. The
autfiors  assume risk netrtrality and decreasing marginal utility, so  these results
can be interpreted as a strolzg  confkmatiorz  of the predictions derived from the
faarsch andARobert’s (1996) model and from Hack  and De Meza’s (1993) model.
without the buyer’s option. Ginsburgh (1998) uses data on wine auctions in
which the auctioneer acts as as  agent for bidders who are not present  at the
auction. He finds Tsrice declines, but apr>arer,tlv the absent bidders eater bids& , * e
which do not fit with the theorv.
The empirical studies bv A&eafelter  axd.  Genesove (1992) (see afso Laffont:
1997) and Beggs and Grad& $997)  cowerg heterogeneous objects. Thev  also
detect price declines. Jones. Menezes and Della  (1996) find  an increasing jrice,, A
aaparentlv  because the composition of the pool of bidders changes over the se-
qiecce  o&he  auction  in response to heterogeceitv  of the objects.x4
3.2 Impfications  for the Dutch flower  auction
Befure  we move on to our  empirical aaalvsis.  we evaluate the relevance of thed /
resuks  io  the theoretical literature. bv examining to what extent the assumptions, J
underlving these results are valid for the Dutch 2ower auction. As we dixld strongJ
evidence of declining prices in OI.X  data. we are mure  interested in explanationsI
of price declines than in explanations of price increases.
It seems that the IPV framework is a reasonably accurate description of the
valuations of bidders at AF44.  Maay bidders are retailers with flower shops that
serve a local neighborhood. These act as monopolistic competitors on the con-
sumption market for filowers  in their neighborhood. From experiecce,  they have
an excellent knowledge of the demand f-unctions of the  products they  sell to the
corx~~rners,  and  these fixnctions  differ across di%erent neighborhoods. 1~  addition
to these b&ers,  there are also large buyers who esport flowers. These are typ-
icallv active in a particular geographical region. where they have some market
power l F’lowers  are highlv perishable goods, so’ there is no scope for extensive
J
retrading after the auction is held.
&4re  bidders at AF.4 risk averse. and if so, would it aEect their behavior at
the auction of a given lot? Often, the price of a given unit covers an extremelv
smaI1  fraction of the budget of a bidder. Most bidders face no strong bindin;
finaociai  constraints. ‘This poicts  towards risk neutrality, but it is diEcult  to
assess whether the ar,oument  holds  fur all. bidders. Other lots that are auctioned
at the same day may be close substitutes fur a given type of flower as supplied
by a given grower. This would provide some insurance against the risk at the
auction of the lot at hand. However. the %pecialtv”  roses we consider are among
the most expensive cut Bowers that’are availabIe.iand the range of substitutes is* /
smaller than fur bulk product Bowers like  most tulips.A
.4re  bidders at -4FA4  often interested in the acquisition of more than one unit?
This seems piausible.  The size of a unit is often chosen to be rather smaI1  and
“handy” l It is verv iikelv  that,  the value to a bidder of a second arnit is alwavsJ 4 J
larger that zero. However, it is aIso IikeIy that the margirral  value decreases as
more  units are bought. so  the value of two units is less than twice the valxe  of a,
single unit. 5
‘The  &4FA4 alwavs  allows for a buver’s  option. 6J a/ The units within a lot are fxllv4/
homogeneous? so any seauentia8. auction at A4F64  deals with fullv  humogeneous
objects. AIsu7  there may ^be  participants who act as agents (e.g. of internatioEaH
trading companies). Finalfv  the marginal costs of participation at successiveU?
rounds within a sequential. auction, of a lot are zero.’
From all of this, we conclude the folluwing.
based OE  the fpric  framework seem refevant.
First, theoretical esplanatiozls
Secondiv. (some) bidders might
be risk averse. We know from the previous subsectiod  ‘that from a theoretical
point of view, risk aversion is a highly unlikeIy  explanation. in particular if thereI ,
are possibilities of retrading after the auction.  Since the latter possibilities are
relatively expensive in case of perishable goods like cut flowers:  we do not yet
exclude the possibility that risk aversion, is driving the price decline. A4  third
conclusion is that the buyer’s option and/or the presence of bidders acting as
agents may well explain the price decline. *4  fourth  conclusion is that explanations
“Tt couid  be argued that having multiple units generates efkiency  gabs  ia t3e market where
the buver  sells the fbwers  to the consumers. However
typiciy prefer a wide variety of available  3on;ers.
, these are pro’bajly smali, acd costumers
%%e that the availability of many close substitutes cc&d reduce the importance of the
buyerk option as a determir,axt of the bidders’  behavior. However, recall that one may expect,
a relativeiy  minor scope fur substitution of “specialty” roses.
7The  acction time is very short. Even Se auction of a !ot with maEy units on!y  takes a
couple of miautes.
based on stochastic values or heterogeneity of objects or r>articigatiotl  costs are
irrelevant. The latter is aiso true for ewlanations based oxsuper-additivity.  SoteA
that saper-additivity  in combi=lation  with a buyer’s o~ioz  would  simr$lv imply* .h J
that the highest bidder buvs all  the objects in the 5rst  round  and a declining
price could never uax.r.  Bkxxse  in the Dutch  flower auction a buver;S oDtiond A
exists and seqzzxes of awtions frequently  OCCC.  sur>eradditive  preferences  ape, *
not TIxx?sent.
L&  a result, three possible espiawtions for the decii=ling price Dhenomenon*
at the Dutch f%ower  auction emerge: risk averse bidders, the buver’s  oDtion.  and,
the nesence of bidders acting as agents. VVe  should however p&x  oit that the*
relation between the  theoretica!  models in the literature and the actcal.  setup
of the Dutch flower auction is not always verv intimate. In Darticular,  most ofe A
the theoretical literature on sequential auctions deals with Eh@ish  auctions or
second-price sealed-bid auctions rather tha2  Dutch awtiocs.  In.  addition, this
literature often StdoDts  a basic auction setting with a maximum  of two objectsL
to be auctioned. It remains  a toCc for further research to investigate to what
extent the theoreticai  predictions& these stlirdies carrv  over to seeuential  Dut&
auctions with mazy  objects. We return to this in S;bsection  4.;.  FinaIly7 the
auction setup may  provide additional reasons  for a price decline which have not
yet been discovered, and  certain aspects of the bidders’ behavior may be missing
from the theoretical models.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 . The data set
We use icformation ox auctions of a particuk  auction group of roses (.4F&4
code 52) for the period J-we 3 - -4ugust  1, 1996.  1~  this x>eriod  of 44 working
davs  almost 24,000 fats  in this grow were auctioned, resukng in about 58.000* I I
tr&sactions.  So, on average there were 550  auctions per dav and 2.4 transactions
per auctioned lot. The .4FhA code 52 roses are so-calieD  "large flower" roses.
These are relatively expensive and have a~  esclusive  image. The leng%h  of the
roses varies from 50  centimeters to over 90 centimeters. On average. the auction
price of a rose increases with its length. The color of the roses ‘mav be red.
brown, geea, yeIlon:,  oran,oe,  Durple: white, saimo~, et cetera. So, there areL ,
obvious diEerences  between the lots. ‘The  heterogeneity between the lots is afsu
illustrated by the wide range of the item price (see below).
Figure 3 shows that there is a lot of variatkoa  concerning the number of units
per lot offered by the growers. -4bout  %OO  lots contaio  o&v B unit, but there
are afso for example about 500  lots that contain 10 units. bbviously  some of
the gowers offer  their fknvers in small  quantities. while others offer their ffowers
in vast quzxntities. The heterogeneitv  between -Ide  lots is ibstrated in the wideG
range of the number of items (individual roses) per unit. *4s  shown in Figure 2,
there are peaks at 80, 100T  120,  140  and 460 items Der unit.
Figure 3 presents the distribution of the number *of transactians  per auctioned
lot. ,4bout  10,000 lots were auctioned in onlv  1 trawaction.  about 5,000 lots io
2 tzmsactions~  etc.. Sote that to studv the phenomenon  of the  declining auctionJ
price we need at least 2 transactions per auctioned lot. Figure  4 shows that
about 23,000 transactions on!y  coacern  1 unit, about 17.000 trar;sactions  concernI
2 units about 8,000  concern 3 wits etc..
Thk minimuk  price x>er  rose is equal to 10 cents. -4s shown in Figwe  5, fur*
about 1430 traxlsactions  the auction did not result in a xice  above this minimum&
nice.  &4bout  300 transactions have a price of 11 cents. etc.. ‘There are more than.A ,
500  transactions fur every price between 20 and 76 cents. The highest price, not
iocluded  in Figure 5, is 265 cents (attained in only 1 transaction).
4.2 Price determinants in auctions of roses
To ;>roceed,  we create a sub-sample in which the range of values of several vari-,
abIt& is somewhat limited. The sub-sample contains information about lots that
co&h less than 11 units and have a number of items per trnit  of 80, 100,  120
or MO.  Furthermore: the length of roses as measured in fOcm is restricted to
equal  50,  60, ‘70,  80 or 90 centimeters. In addition. we restrict attention to the
abouzt 20  products for which the number of trans&tions  during the period of
analysis is larger than 1000. Finally7 we omit information ore  lots of which part
was destroyed because the price fell below the minimum price (13  observations).
We also do not use lots in which a minirmxm purchase quantity was used dur-
ing the sale (744  observations). The sub-sampie  contains information 0x1.  14,092
transactions.
We analyze the price elects of characteristics of the rose and the auctian setup
by estimating an. equation with the log of the prices as dependent variable and
several dummv variabIes  as explanatorv variables. The explanatory variables are
dav of the we&, a qualitv indicator, tie  number of units Der  lot, the number ofd , v & I
items per unit, the length of the ruses and the product code. ‘f‘he  reference group
concerns  Monday:  high quality, 1 unit lot.  80 items/unit, length 50  centimeters,
and axle  of the product codes.
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The estimation resuks  zre  xxeseoted  in Table 1. fo  general, the x>arameter.A L
estimates are hi&iv significant. which is not sunxising given the size of the
data set. Prices ared the  highest ‘on Moodavs. ‘The  jowest  Drices  are recorded on
~Thursdays  when prices are oa average 12 ~ercect  lower &&I oa ASdondav  Roses4 . J-
which Eere labelkd to have a low qualitv are on average 27%  cheaper than rosesd
without  sxh a label. Holding everything eke coastaat?  lots of me uait have the
lowest zxice. The price increases with more than 10  percent for lots of 2 or 3
uaits. TabIe 1 afso  shows that prices are oa average the highest for units which
contain  80  flowers. Lots that contain 100 aod 120 sowers  per unit are about 6
percent cheater.  Lots with* i40  flowers Der  units are 19  Dercent cheater.  This* 4 .A
may very well  be czwed  by unobserved qua&v  elects such that lower quality
Bowers  are oRered  in larger units. ‘The lengh of a rose is an importaat price
determinant.  Roses of 90 centimeter are 53  Dercent more extensive  than roses
of 50 centimeter. There  are also large price differences between different zxoduct*
codes.
Table f also shows the results of a regressio a in which the rank number  of the
transaction within the sequential auctioning of the lot is inckded as an explana-
torv  variable- The  rank number  has a positive elect on the price. lkits sold irrJ
the second transaction  are, on average. 1.5 Dercexlt  more extensive.  ‘This  results/ d.
seems to contradict a declining price of sales within
could be affected by unubserved  qua&v  diEerexes.u
examine this in more detail.
Table 2 shows the direction of the grice  movemer?,ts
wit&n  the sequential auction of a lo;. diskguished
transaction. Considering all  transactiks.  the number,
a lot. kowever,  this result
In the next subsection we
between subsecpent  rounds
bv the rank  number of theu
of instances where the price
increases is slightlv below the number of traxlsactioos  where the price decreases.
From the first take  second transaction the wice  more often increases than
decreases. The opposite is the case for most of thk  subsequent transactions. These
results do not provide conclusive evidence of either a price decline or increae.
In fact. as Kcser and Olson (1996) show, a comwrison between the number, *
of increases and decreases is not verv informative on.  the importance of xxicebd *
declines.
4.3 Price changes in the sequential auction
&4 simple regression of the  transaction price on the rank nxm3er  of the transaction
can be misleading, for two reasox. To understand the first  reason, note  that the
maximum rank  number differs across arrctions  of diRerent  lots. it is plausible
that the value  of this maximum rank number is not exogenous, because it is an
outcome of the behavior of the auction participants and may depend on realized
prices earlier on in the sequential auction. SuDpose  that there is a characteristic
of the rose or the auction setup that is unobserved to us but observed by the
auction participants. This may affect both the level of the prices within the
sequential auction  and the number of rounds in the sequential auction. A4  result
of this may be that a relativeIy  high price throughout the seqrrential  auction often
goes together with a relativelv large number of rounds. This means that in the
data, among the realized pricks at transactions with large rank  numbers, there
are relatively mary high xxices. The regression coeEicient  of the rank number
is then biased upward  (i-i.;  the price declines more thaz as suggested by the
regression estimite) .
.A second (related)  reason for whv  a simple regression can be misleading is
that the price observations for a give; sequential auction are typicaily  not inde-
pendent. There may be unobserved price determinants which affect all realized
prices  within a seqEentia1 auction. In that case, regressions may generate biased
results even if the number of rounds would be the same for al1 sequential  auctions.
Xote  that this criticism also afFects  the results in ,Table  1.  3’0  a certain extent we
dealt with this by alluwing for fked  elects fur ‘ehe  identity of the product.
To advarxe,  we estimate a fixed effect model for the price as a function of rHe
rank  onmber  of. the transaction within the sequential auction. *This  model states
that
where  pi j is the price per flower in the transaction with rank number j = 1, l . . . Ji
in the siqr?entiai  auction of lot i = 7p4  l ... N. ‘The  lot-specific fixed  effect & &p-, ,
tures  observed and unobserved heterogeneity between lots. The dummy vari-
able dij denotes the rank number of the transaction. The series of ;$j(j =
2: . . . , &axi  l Ii) coeEcients  captures the price change within a lot, relative to the
f&t kansactioc.  These are the parameters of interest. We  normkze  /$=  0, and
we define
Finally, the random variable ~~~  captures the remaining variation in pi j
assumed to be identically and  &dependently  distributed across i and  j. ’
and  is
Bv analogy to the fixed-effect Dane&data  model:  the $‘T  coefficients  can be
estiznked by ordinary least squaresA  (OLS) routines. Specifically7  the fixed  elects
are removed bv estimating the model (I)  by OL-S  with variables that are measuredbJ
in deviation from their average over j = 2,  . . . : l Ji. Lots that are sold irz one round
do not contribr;te  to the estimation since  in that case the price logp,  ? equals the
average Of IOg pi ja Sate  that with this estimation,  approach, the effekof observed
characteristics iike those examined in the previous subsection are absorbed into
the fixed effect and are consequentlv  not estimated along with the $‘;  coeEkiezts.
An alternative method to eiin&ace the fixed  elect from the mode1 is to
take first di%erences  of (1) for pairs of consewtive  rounds. Hn this case, the
mice change from one transaction to the subseauect  is directly entered as the
kdogenous variable in a regression. The price c:?ange from the (j - ijt’- to the
3l t5 round eauafs1 .
(2)
‘This  estimation approach does not impose a xxiori  that the fixed  effect is the
same in aif  rour,ds withirz  the sequential au&x  of a lot.  Aa advantage of this
is that data on auctions that are finished ir, say j, rounds do not DIav a role
ic the estimation of the price chasges  ic rounds j > jg.  ‘The  equatikzs”  (2) can
be estimated directly by OLS. The estimated coefficient is simplv  the averageJ
observed log price decline.
Both estimation approaches onfv  xse information OE  transactions within a
sequential auction to estimate the LBect  of the rank number on the price. The
resulting estimates are not affected by the possible biases mentioned at the be-
ginning of the subsection.
If the specification of the model equation (1)  is correct then the ,3;  estimates
obtained with both approaches are asymptotically the same. In fact?  they are
always exactly the same for ,&. Moreover, if tJi  does not depend on i then  thev
are evea exacth the sameJ for-all ,9;  (see Appendix I, which contains a detaile&
camparison  of the two estimation approaches). In general. the estimates based on
the fixed  elect approach are more efficient than those based on first diEerencing.
If the sets of ,3;  estimates diEer  substantiallv then this suggests that thed
model is miswecified.  In realitv.  the price may be aRected by the interaction
between the &ed  effect and thkaxk  number of the transaction. ‘This *means
that unobserved lot-swcifk determinants of the  price lez;el also aEect the amout
of price change u-i&z the awtion  of the lot. fn ttiat case. auctions with matnv, 2/
rounds may also have a diRerent  Dattern  of price changes than auctions that areJ
faished in a few rounds?
SThe urabserved lot-specific  xice  ckterminazts  nav  &so  have a Ciferent  efkct  on t&  priceL A v
For  both apxxoaches.  the estimated coefhcients  are given io  ‘Table  3. Sote that* ,
the results obtained with first  differences are in fact based on separate  estimations
for each fl;. whereas the fixed effect apxxoach estimates all cokEkien.ts  together.
The em&ical analysis provides verv&ong evidence for declining prices within
the sequential auction. The point  est&ate for the first price change ,k$  is exactlv
the sa,me  under the two approaches (2.2 Dercent).  For the subsequent rounds.
the fixed elect ax>proach  generally predick  Hess decreasing prices than the first
differences approach. With the ked  effect apDroach,  the price change becomes4 .
irrsignifkant after the 5”’ round.  With first dif?erences, the largest price decline is
observed from the 3r”  to the 4’:’  round (2.8 nercent).  After that the nice decfixres* r*
somewhat less. In -ilipr,endix 1 \ve  show that the difference between the two setsL
of estimates suggests that the  price decline Der  round is smaller in lots that are.b
auctioned in a ma11 number  of rounds. We return to t,his in the next subsecl’tion.
4.4 A closer look at the price decline
In this subsection we evaluate empirical evidence for the plausibility of the three
remaining explanations for the declining xxice at the Dutch fiuwer  auction: risk
aversion, the buyer’s option, and the xxeience  of bidders who act as agents. It, *
should ‘se stressed from the outset that the contents of this subsection is rather
speculative. Virtuallv a11  of the theoretical Iiterature on zrice  changes in se-
quential auctions deais  with Engfish  auctions or second-price seaIed-bid  auctions
rather than Dutch auctions. In addition, this literature often adopts a basic auc-I
tioo setting with  a maxkrrrum of two objects to be auctioned. It is not certain
that the theoretical predictions in these studies and the corresDonding  intuition.&
always carry over to the rather specific sequential Dutch axxtion  we consider in
this paper-
The literature on the  ef?ect  of the buyer’s option is a case in point. Recall
that 3lack  and De ,\/leza  (1993) only  examine second-xxice  sealed-bid auctions
and Er@ish  auctions. and only examine auctions of twi objects (so the number/
of rounds is at most two). Moreover, they show that if the number of bidders is
larger than tvvo  then in some cases tfie  price may actually rise. akhorzgh  numericalI
cha11ge  at eariy rounds than on the price change at Iater xxnds.  For esampfe,
With additiOIZ%l parameters yj. One cm think of may dterrrative  generalizations  of model (l).
IVe do not pursce the estimatio=1 of scch general .modeis. However, 5n  the zext subsection we
estkde some speci6c  departures from  mode1 (1).
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esaxlples  with three buvers suggest that on average the price declines.
In Table 4 we examine  the data 03  lots  that consist of two OF  three units at
the beginning of the sequential auction. In particular7  we show the relationship
between the number of u&s  bought axd  t5e  arice  changes at subsequent  rounds.
For the  13Ei two-unit 10~s  there are two Dossibiiities:  “the iot is soid  ixz one round*
or in two rounds. The fomer apDlies 940 to lots  while the latter aDplies to
405  lots. For the latter lots. the average mice decline over the two subsecuent
auctions is 3.6%. This echoes the results of the previoas subsection. and a&hat,
can be said is that it does not contradict the predicted elect of a kmyer’s  option.
From the results in Black and De Meza  (1993) it follows that the bwe?sY
option is typically exercised if the price at t5e kst  round is low in the sense
that the valuation of the actual buver  is EW.%  larger than the  vakations of &e
other participants. As argued in the previous subsection. we do not use the
data on the price levels  ia the empirical  analysis of the mice  changes, because of,
possible endogeoeitv  problems. To a certain esteot.  we caa however check this
prediction fndirec& using the data 02  the three-u&lots. If the price at a certain
round is low then one aav  expect the subsequent price decline to be relativelyv
smal in absolute size. Therefore, one  znav exsect  to see a freTdent  simultaneousI 0 .A
occurrexxe  of the exercise of xhe  buyer’s option with a small subsequent price
declxne.
In the data OE  the 1099  three-unit. lots there are four possible trajectories. The
first is that the lot is sold in one go. In that case no mice  change is observed.
In the second trajectory, the fot is sold in twu rounds, &d the buver’s  option is1 d
exercised in the second round. In the t&d trajectory, the lot is also sold  in two
rounds7  but the bweT:s  oxion is used in the fkst  round when two of the threecc *
urrits  are bought. The comparism  between the mice  declines in the latter two
trajectories coo&xx  the above hypothesis that tie exercise of the buver’s optionc/
is often foUowed  by a small price decline.
Sow let us &urn  to the evidence for risk aversion of bidders. Our line of
reasoning is the foi1owing. If risk aversion is important, it will probabfv not showI e
up inz situatiom where the auctioned fot consists of maw units and the auction
has just started. On the other har?d.  if few xx&s are led,  the risk  that no more
units n+iU  be available for a subseqiezt  saIe is larger. so price declines may beI
expected to be larger.
As a first esamde we investigate  auctions of tez-unit lots  of which in the
f&t auction 1 . c&was  soid (total of ‘71  transactions). This leaves  9 units to
be auctioned in the second round. If one unit is sold ic the second  round the
average price decline is f 2% (32  transactions) 7 if two units are sold the average
price decline is 2.3% (18  transactions). if three units are sold the average price
decline is 3.5% (12  transactions). In the latter situation there are still six units
left for the third round. So. even in a situation,  where  manv  units are left to be, d
bought a;e  find a price decline.
Xext.  we examine the arice  decline between two rounds as a function of the/ *
number of units that are left at the beginning of the first of these two rounds.
The results are in the first column of .TabIe  *5. Indeed. price declines are larger
when there are few units ieft for safe. To see whether &is  is a specific result for
the first two rounds after the *moment  at which few units are left, we perform
the same exercise for the xxice change from the second lo third round after that*
moment. The results are in the second  column of Table *j.  Xo  svstematic  elects4
are fuund  between the two columns.
However. we  should be careful in derivkg conclusions from Table 5. &4s  we
already saw ‘in Table 3, price declines are especially large in the beginning of the
sequential auction. Table 5 shows that price declines are Iarge  when only a few
units remain to be sold-  Both results can be driven by lots that consist  of only a
few units. When the auctio;l  starts fur these lots then already in the beginning a
few units remain to be sold. To distinguish between the two effects we estimate a
fixed  elect model in which we correct both for the rank number of the transaction
and for the number of units remaining at the start of each round?
where j refers to the rank number of the transaction and k refers to the remaining
number of units at the beginning of round j -  1.  So:  for a two-unit lot that is
auctioned in two rounds; j =  k = 2, for a three-unit lot where we  consider the
price change from the Erst  to the second round j = 2. k = 3, for a price change
from the second to the third round j = 3, k =  2 etc:. The’ reference case is a
tw+unit lot that is auctioned in twu rounds. In this case we canxnot  distinguish
between the effect of the rank number  of the transaction and the effect of the
remaining number of units. .The  value of x captures the price change fur this‘1
case. If we find  “ftz  > 0, then this is evidence that the strongest decline is earlv 0x1.4
in the auction, whereas if 7~~ > 0, then this is evidence that the strongest  decline
is where oniy  a few units remain?
‘The estimation results are in ‘Table 6. ‘f’he  first column shows the estimation
results if we impose y:! =  ~4~ = 0. ‘Then,  we measure the average r>rice  change overA
91?or  these estkmtes  we  use iots containing 2-6 units.
lCYote  that at tEL A end of Subsection 4.3 we found  evidence of an iaterzctioc  effect between
j and k on the price decline. We do cot pcrsue this futher.
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two subsequent auctions a-ithin  the same lot. Ir;  turns out that the average price
decline is 2.8%. In the second column we impose 73  = 0. Then, we oxnlv consider, e
the effect of the rank number of the transaction. ,The  resulting estimate of ~4:  is
= -2.6%. Furthermore, we 5cd  that yz < 0. indicating chat the price declines/ I
irxrease  at the Xater rouods.  The third colwmn of Table 6 shows the estimatioa
results if we impose y2  = 0. Sow, we find  that the coefficient ;I~ > 0 indicating
that the fewer the remaining number of units. the larger the price decline. In the
fourth cu1umz.1  of Table 6 we show the resuks  for the f~i! equation. The results
are similar as before albeit that 1?,0w  yz does not dif!Fer  from zero at cozwentioaal
levels  of signi&xuxe.
Our concIusioxl is that the declining price is particulariv important in the
be,oi@ning  of a sequential auction irrespective of the number*of  u&s  to be aw-
timed. It is true that the declixle is stronger the smaller the number of uaiis that
remain, but the evidence is not sT;Ecientlv  unambiguous to con&de  that risk, v’
aversion is an important determinarzt  of the declking price phenomenon.
FinaIIy:  we investigate whether the phenomeoon  that some bidders may act
as agesits cam explain the deciining  price.” We  do this bv considering whetherd
there is a svstematic  differexe betwee@  large  and small buvers. When a pr;rchase
is made. tie buyer identifier num3er  is registered. -4s  we saw in Section 2. theI
diEerexnces  in buyer size are enormow.  During the period under investigation.
613 differeat  buvers bought the tvpes of roses we consider here. The largest sis
buvers are respoisible  fur 20 pen&t  of the total sales. We  classify Suvers  in few”
0cwkxx  dependicg  oo  their total wrchase  of roses.A A 558  buvers are classified asc)
small Ixvers.  Tluey rearesent  30 percent of total sales. 27 buvers are class%ed*I * v
as medium. Thev are responsib!e  for 20 percent of the tot&  sales. 22 buvers
are classified as l&y. Together ihev account for 30 Derceot  of total salesd  &4sJ A
mentioned. the very large  buyers are responsible for the remaining sales.
Table i shows the relation betweez  the rank raum‘oer  of the transaction and
the type of Suyer. X0  clear r.e!ationship  caa  ‘be found. Small  buyers tend  to buv
relatively moxe often in the second and third round but  the differences are smal;.
Table 8 presents the relation  between the tvpe of buyer and the nwn3er  of unitsJ
that are available at the start of the sequential. auction. Large buvers tend to
buv more fxeqaentlv  when the number of units that are available is iarge.  Large
buiers aDparentIv  iave a preference fur buviog  maw  units of the same kind  of
flokers.  ff there is only ace ur,it  left.  the majoritv  of t:he  3wers  is small.  However/ * s/
evea the verv large  buvers are involved in these one-unit sales.+/ v
If the large or the verv large bidders would behave as agents we would expect
them to be active more  fiequentiv  at the beginning of the auction, and we wcwidaJ *
expect them to be inactive when unfv a few units are available. This nat beingc/
the case we conclude that the phenomenon that bidders act as agents is not  a
very im;portaxlt  determinant of the decfining  prices we observe over the sequence. A ,
of auctions.
5 Conclusions
By now there is a substantia:  literature  011  price movements in sequential auctions.
Theoretic&  studies often focus on second-price auctions. Empirical anakses areSt
often descriptive. In OUT  paper we analyze data from the &4akmeer Flower  Auc-
tion QX~, sequential Dutch auctions of homogeneous lots of roses. Using rather
soDhisticated  econometric techniaues.  we find  that there is a price decline in se-
quential auctions. VVe  can dismiss  sdme of the explanatiuns put fuward  in the
theoreticd fiterature.  It trrzrns  ant that the explanation in terms of the presence
of the buyer’s  option is consistent with the price declines  we find is the  data.
Since price declines also OCCUF  in situations where there are stiI1  numerous units
to  be auckrzed  we feef  that risk aversion is not a verv important expIa.nation
of the declining prices of roses. From the fact that there  does not seem to be
a systematic difference in b’elyer’s  behavior between small  and large buvers  we-4
conclude that agent behaviar is not a very important determinant of the price
decline either. Therefore, after a process of elimination we conclude that the
presence of a buver’s  option  is an important determinant of the price decline ofa/
ruses.
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Figure 2. Dis+tibution  of the number of flowers (i.e. hems) per unit
Figure 3. Distribution of tie rnumber of transaciions  per auction, of a iot
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Figure 5. Disrriburior,  of the price of rmes
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Tabfe  1 Estimation results  log price per flower with and without transaction order as regressor
(t-vdues in parentheses)a’
Tuesday -0.073 (-7.46) -0.074 (-7.57)
Wednesday -0.088 (-8.72) -0.088 (-8.73)
ThUBday -O.!B (-I 1.01) -0.1E3 (4 I -OS)
Ftidzy -0.Q32 (-3.23) -0.033 (-3.37)
Luw qua&y -0.270 (-21.24) -0.268 (-21.09)
Loasize(excIudedcabego~:  funit)
2 ufiits 0.105 (6.82) 0.103 (6.64)
3 vnits 0.110 (7.18) OS04 (6.66)
4 units 0.090 (5.76) 0.079 (4.99)
5 units 0.095 (5.88) 0.08 x (4.90)
61x&s 0.090 (5.68) 0.073 (4.44)
7units 0.061 (3.57) 0.04 i (2.32)
8un&s 0.101 (5.74) 0.076 (4.18)
9 units 0.049 (2.92) 0.02x (Lr9)
10  units 0.070 (3.71) 0.040 (2.01)
Number of Rowers (items) per unil  (excluded category: SO flowers)
IO0 -0.076 (-5.82) -0.075 (-5.75)
120 -0.065 (-4.73) -0.064 (-4.65)
140 -0.195 (-11.55) -0.193 (-I I.45)
Length of flower ( excluded categury:  50 cm)
6Ocm 0.157 (12.62) 0.155 (12.45)
70 cm 0.317 (25.58) 0.31.5. (25.13)
8Ocm 0.440 (32.98) 0.434 (32.47)
90 cm 0.536 (35.94) 0.529 (35.38)
Rank number of transaction (excluded category: X)
2 0.015 (1.83)
3 0.035 (3.32)
4 0.054 (3.71)
5 0.071 (3.18)
5 0.145 (3.70)
7 0.160 (2.17)
a) The estimated equations alfow  for fixed effects for each product code (20 in total).
Table 2 Sign of price changes by rank numbers of the transactions (% of total)
Eiak  numbers of transactions
-x+2 2+3 3-A 4-95 5-6 6+7 a3
Dedine 34 42 49 47 42 19 39
Consmnt 20 29 30 31 38 52 24
Increase 46 29 22 22 20 30 37
N of obse,rvations 3777 1953 867 334 100 27 7058
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Table 3 Estimated price changes at successive transactions, by rank numbers of the transactions
(t-vabes  in parentheses)
Rank numbers of tie tnnsactiorns
1+2 Z--+3 3-34 4-+5 5*6 6-7
fixed  effm  aprxoach -0.0223I -0.0200 -0.02X7 -0.0X70 -0.0085 -0.0057
(-14.57) (40.00) (-7.55) (-3.78) (-1.07) (-0.37)
first differences -0.0223 -0.024 I -0.0279 -0.0268 -0.0171 -0.0064
(-15.37) (-16.59) (42.08) (-7.56) (-3.39) (-0.54)
TabIe  4 Price changes fur lots of two and three units
price change (%)
nr of lots from Is; to from 2nd
2nd round to 3rd
I round (2 units) 940
2 rounds (I and 3. unit) 405 -3.57
price change (%)
Three-unir  lot nr of Iots from 1st to from 2nd
2nd round to 3rd
1 mund(3ur*its) 463
2 rounds (I and 2 units) 267 -4.38
2 ruumds(2and  1 unit) 241 -2.52
3 rounds (3 times I unit) 128 -0.73 -2.18
TabXe 5 Price decline by number of remaining tits (t-values in parentheses)
price decline
nr of units left
before saie
first to second second to third
2 -0.0357 (-7.45) -0.0266 (-5.49)
3 -0.0294(-7.94) -0.0333 (-8.39)
4 -0.0235 (-6.83) -0.0234(-6.15)
5 -0.0216 (-5.32) -0.0307 (-7.68)
6 -0.0206(-4.87) -0.0165 (-4.70)
7 -0.0163 (-3.34) -0.0182 (-4.72)
S -0.0064(-1.74) -0.0269 (-5.02)
9 -0.0194 (-4.10) -0.0294 (-3.41)
10 -0.0112 (4 .S4) no observations
2s
Table  6 Estimation resuHts  for the effects of the rank number of the tra~lsaction  and the number
of remaining units (coefficients * 100; t-values in parentheses)
1 2 3 4
-2.75 (20.3) -2.58(16.0) -3.31 (14.4) -3.13 (11.4)
-0.39 (2.0)
oil (3.0)
-0.24 (1.2)
0.28 (2.5)
Tabk  7 Size of buyer by rank number of transaction (percentages, number of transactions)
size of buyer (row %>
RZ&
r?umber
medium ve,y  !xge rxmber  of
Large trmsactions
38
44
45
40
42
40
26
x00
41
29
27
27
29
26
30
48
0
28
7034
3777
1953
867
334
IO0
23
4
I4092
Table S Size of buyer by number of units left  for safe (percentages, number of transactions)
type of buyer
lx- of units
left for sale
mid&e
d
P 9
2
3
4
14
13
12
5
6
7
8
9
10
total
51
41
40
38
38
37
36
39
35
34
41
I5
17
I8
71 9
20
20
19
x9
22
19
!8
25
29
29
large
3x
29
29
30
30
26
29
28
2485
3028
2251
I833
very large number af
1328
Z148
transactions
740
549
477
213
14092
74
15
15
92
‘17
17
33
r3
29
Appendix I. Fixed effects verstls first differences
First we show that if the number of transactions is the same for each lot, then the fixed
effect approach is equivalent to estimation in first differences. Suppressing the error
term, the model can be written as
J
Yij =a: +x,f,,tZ$  j =  l,...,Ji=  l,...Jv.
x,-’-1
where
i = indicator for lot  ,.
J = rank  number of transaction within lot,
Y = log(price  per  fIowex in round j for lot i>
Iq = 1 if j=k,
= G otherwise.
The fixed effects can be eliminated by rewriting this in differences from the cluster
(rot)  means. fn matrix notation
with
where
yi = (L.ir 1. . . yjj and M, = ZJ -,I,I; -
The J normaI  equations can be written as
The estimated price change from the j” to the (+l)” round is defined as (fi’  -&:) l
The matrix MJ takes differences from the means. By subtracting the u+l>“l from the
j:”  normal equation this mean cancels out. Hence,
The estimated price change from the j”
average log  price difference from j”
to the (ii-l)”  round is estimated by the
to the u+l)&  round. The same estimate results
from estimating the model in first differences. Suppressing the enor  term, the first
difference specification for the price change from the j”’ to the (j+l>;’ round is
Y. . - Y
- a
tJ i(  j-t:> - /j i=l,..J (5)
where x is defined as the  price change. I[t  follows directly that
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In our  application, tie total number of rounds varies across lots. We show that
in that case tie estimators with the fixed effect approach and those based on first
differences are generally  not tie same. Define Ji  as the tota number of rounds fox lot i
and fet  J=max(J1 ,. . .,&). AMaintaining  the sang notation, the fixed effect equations
can now  be written as
My= h!fxp
(7)
with
where
I-[ I3; = I3, 0 witi  dimension (pi x J)  and
T&e normal equations can now be written as
48)
where
Nj = the number of lots whicfi are soId in j rounds.
Lots which are sold in f round are excluded, since the price then equals  the fixed
effect of the lot.  Since all other lots ze sold in at least 2 rounds, the estimated ptice
change when going from the first to second round is the same as before
(A -I%)= I ./
c N j‘-/-I!
(9)
This is identical to the estimator for the fast differences approach.
The estimators of the price change when going from the second to third  round
is not tie same fur the two approacfies. For the fixed effect approach, subtracting the
third  frum  the second norma equation yields
in  which (9) can be substituted. This yields  an expression for (A -a).
Taking first differences yields the following estimator for the price change
when going from the second to third round,
Tk twc~  estimators are cXearly  different if N2>0  and N; -t Nd + . . . >O. A similar
arwment can be made for price changes in subsequent transa&ons.22
I.Xng (IO) we can say something about how the two estimators compare. If the
average price decline from the first to second round is larger in the lots that are sofd  in
two rounds than in the whole sample, &en the value  of the fixed effect estimate of, \
(I%  7%) wifl be more negative than the value of the estimate based WI first
differences.
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